



FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

VOLUME 37 NUMBER 19

The Lessons of Latin America

by Herbert L. Matthews

The storm that hit Vice President Richard M. Nixon on his trip around South America seemed to him and many other Americans, from President Dwight D. Eisenhower down, to have come out of a clear sky. At least, most Americans were surprised by its fury, which is a measure of the pervading ignorance and neglect of Latin America in the United States.

A great many forces, some going far back in hemispheric history, converged to bring about the explosions of hostility that the Nixons met on their good will journey. Factors of extreme complexity were involved—our own history and character, the fact that we have suddenly been thrust into a predominant position in the free world, the long course of our relations with Latin America, the cold war, the influence of communism and nationalism, the economic picture, the history of the Latin American countries and the character of their peoples.

A manifestation that covers eight different countries of South America is not an accident, nor can it be brushed aside as the nefarious work of Communists. Those who organized and inspired the demonstrations against Mr. Nixon could not have succeeded if the climate

of opinion in which they worked were not favorable to them. So let us not delude ourselves by saying it was all the fault of the Reds, or all Richard Nixon's fault or that of the State Department, or a failure of security arrangements, or Latin American ingratitude.

Fortunately, Vice President Nixon was the first to see and say that the basic reasons for the hostile demonstrations he encountered were deep and complicated and that our own policies had to bear a share of the blame. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee is quite properly undertaking a long and serious study of our relations with Latin America. This study will be directed by one of the few senators who have shown any interest in Latin American affairs—Wayne Morse, Democrat of Oregon, who is a true liberal.

Every newspaper in the United States and thus every newspaper reader has suddenly been brought to realize that Latin America is not just a geographic expression and that something must be very wrong either with our policies or with our public relations or both for such a degree of hostility to exist. The point was driven home by the fact that while a Venezuelan mob was venting its fury on the

JUNE 15, 1958

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION INCORPORATED
345 EAST 46TH STREET • NEW YORK 17, NEW YORK

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Nixons, demonstrations that resulted in the burning of United States Information Agency libraries were also taking place in Beirut and Algiers.

What Vice President Nixon did, inadvertently, was to prove the failure of our Latin American policy. Up to a point, any representative of the United States was going to meet hostility in Latin America for reasons beyond our control today.

If we are to understand the situation we face, we must start with a history of dollar diplomacy and armed intervention that Latin Americans have not yet forgotten. Anti-Yankeeism is a declining but still potent emotion which politicians can readily invoke, especially if they are demagogically inclined or have Marxist tendencies. It is an aspect of the nationalism that has been so strong in all underdeveloped regions since World War II.

Washington's Miscalculations

Unfortunately, President Eisenhower revived the unhappy memories of our intervention some 40 years ago in Mexico, Nicaragua, Haiti, Cuba and the Dominican Republic by his sudden, angry decision to send American Marines to the Caribbean. It was the worst possible gesture to make in the circumstances, and it was quite unnecessary. It will be a long time before Latin Americans forget this or before we live it down.

This was the one unquestionable error made in connection with Mr. Nixon's dramatic trip. For his own part, the Vice President behaved with

courage and patience, and he showed remarkable acumen in grasping immediately the reasons why he was the object of such hostility. If Mr. Nixon is to be criticized, it is for his basic misconception that he could go around Latin America debating with university students as if he were taking on debating teams at Harvard, Columbia or Stanford universities. Students in all Latin American countries are passionately involved in politics, and there is among them a strong element of radicalism and even communism.

Mr. Nixon apparently knew that he would face hostility, but neither he nor the State Department and diplomatic advisers took into account that this hostility was so widespread and deep that the radical students and the professional Communist agitators were in a position to cause the most serious kind of popular demonstrations. Moreover, Washington seems to have had no realization of the fact that the itinerary would permit the agitators to benefit by what happened at earlier stops and thus to build up the hostile demonstrations like an avalanche, which reached its grand climax at Mr. Nixon's last stop at Caracas, Venezuela.

However, one must always get back to the basic fact: there is a great deal of hostility toward the United States in Latin America. Otherwise, these demonstrations could not have taken on the proportions they did.

Mr. Nixon, however, immediately realized two things—that the demonstrations were not against him per-

sonally, and that they were not against the American people. They were directed against the United States government and the policies it has been following in recent years.

In these policies economics have played a big role. Latin America is, on the whole, a region that lives by exporting mineral and agricultural products and importing industrial equipment, machinery and food. The countries Mr. Nixon visited live mainly by exporting tin, lead, zinc, copper, oil, wool tops and coffee. During the past year the prices of all these commodities have fallen sharply in world markets, with disastrous results for Latin America.

What U.S. Is Blamed For

No one blames the United States for this. The same prices have fallen here too. What the United States is blamed for is that it attempts to raise tariffs on copper, lead, zinc and wool tops, to cut petroleum imports, and to let the price of coffee fall without trying to stabilize it.

Latin Americans do not resent the fact that we have refused to lend them money for capital investments, because it is conceded that we have done a great deal. What the Latin Americans complain about is that they have not had their fair share of American loans and investments, that every suggestion they make for plans to stabilize commodity prices or set up special funds are rejected offhand without any countersuggestions, and that we are putting up trade barriers against them.

(Continued on page 152)

Published twice a month by the FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, INC., 345 East 46th Street, New York 17, N.Y., U.S.A. EDITORIAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE: JOHN S. BADEAU • ROBERT R. BOWIE • BENJAMIN J. BUTTENWIESER • EDWIN F. CHINLUND • HENRY STEELE COMMAGER • BROOKS EMENY • AUGUST HECKSCHER • HAROLD F. LINDER • MARGARET PARTON • STEPHEN H. STACKPOLE. • *President*, JOHN W. NASON • *Editor*, VERA MICHELES DEAN • *Washington Contributor*, NEAL STANFORD • *Assistant Editor*, GWEN CROWE. • *The Foreign Policy Association contributes to the public understanding by presenting a cross-section of views on world affairs. The Association as an organization takes no position on international issues. Any opinions expressed in its publications are those of the authors.* • Subscription Rates: \$4.00 a year; single copies 20 cents. RE-ENTERED AS SECOND-CLASS MATTER SEPTEMBER 26, 1951 AT THE POST OFFICE AT NEW YORK, N.Y., UNDER THE ACT OF MARCH 3, 1879. Please allow one month for change of address. Contents of this BULLETIN may be reproduced with credit to the Foreign Policy Association.

347

Produced under union conditions and composed, printed and bound by union labor.



The Middle East Storm

The present storm in the Middle East shows no sign of abating. There is no lull—just degrees of intensity. The Mideast dust refuses to settle.

However, there are some assumptions on the Middle East on which most people in Washington would agree. First, this area is the world's currently most dangerous powder keg. Second, the Middle East is in a state of political flux in which almost anything can happen. Third, whether the West likes it or not, the U.S.S.R. has become a Middle East power and has no intention of withdrawing. Fourth, its rich oil reserves still make it the grand prize in the cold war. Fifth, it is the seat of the world's most intense racial hatreds—not just Arab versus Jew, but Arab versus Arab. And sixth, in this area the United States has no clear, definable, specific goals beyond the general goals of peace, security and freedom, which have to be spelled out if they are to become practical policy.

If the United States has a clear, definable, specific program for the Middle East, it is not visible or discoverable here. There is the Eisenhower Doctrine, providing for a nearly non-existent threat—overt Soviet aggression in this region. There is the old three-power resolution, now gathering dust, which was to keep the Arabs and Israelis from each other's throats—but did not. And the United States is a silent partner of the Baghdad pact of which Britain is a full member.

But what, for example, is Washington's policy toward Nasser? One month Washington is "agin" him; the next, for him; and then again it operates on a live-and-let-live basis. Or take our United Nations policy

on Middle East problems. The United States pulled the rug out from under its British and French allies and the Israelis in the Suez crisis of 1956, forcing them out of Egypt; but it has winked at Egyptian violations of the UN Charter as regards Israel, and has made no serious effort to persuade the Arabs to make peace with Israel as part of an over-all Suez settlement.

What Is U.S. Policy?

Nature is not the only thing that abhors a vacuum. Politics does also. And when the British and French withdrew somewhat hastily—after some American prodding—from the Middle East, Washington had no plan to fill the vacuum, while the Russians did. This was a sin of omission on our part which history may record as the greatest mistake of our recent foreign policy.

For the moment the Israeli-Arab clash of interests and aims in the Middle East is overshadowed by the conflict between the Nasser-led United Arab Republic and the Arab Federation of Iraq and Jordan. It is no secret that President Nasser sees himself as the champion of Arab unity and eventual spokesman for the whole area. It is also no secret that the Arab League is genuinely fearful of his ambitions and of his association with the U.S.S.R. This inter-Arab conflict is at the moment more critical, more active, more fraught with far-reaching consequences than the dispute between Israel and its Arab neighbors.

What is needed above all else in this strife-torn region is Arab acceptance of Israel's existence and continued presence. As long as the Arab

nations not only refuse to make peace with Israel, but are determined to wipe it off the map, there can be no peace in the area. And, difficult as an Arab-Israeli settlement would be in any case, the difficulty has been compounded by the acceptance in the area of the Soviet Union as a great power with vast influence. For Moscow, given the opportunity, would do anything anywhere to embroil and embarrass the United States. The Lebanese crisis is as much "made in Moscow" as "made in Beirut" or "made in Cairo." Jordan's internal troubles before it aligned itself with Iraq were Communist-inspired rather than indigenous manifestations of unrest.

President Nasser's recent 18-day tour of the U.S.S.R. and Khrushchev's pledge to back him only point up more sharply the new order that is in the making in the Middle East. For through Egypt, Syria and subversive agents throughout the area, the Russians make clear that they intend to have a say in Middle East affairs—even *the* say if they can achieve it.

Four facts or factors dominate this whole area: Russia's presence, Arab disunity, Israel's existence and American uncertainty. There is nothing that can be done about the first except to try and keep it in check. The second depends largely on Nasser and whether his ambitions have limits. The third is basic and is at present at an impasse. The fourth is the only one about which the United States could do something unilaterally and effectively—given the intense restudy of foreign policy and the strong leadership required for success.

NEAL STANFORD



Should Reciprocal Trade Program Be Continued?

by Clair Wilcox

Dr. Wilcox, professor of economics at Swarthmore College, is the author of *A Charter for World Trade* (New York, Macmillan, 1949), and other books. From 1945-48 he served as director of the Office of International Trade Policy in the Department of State. This article, here revised, originally appeared as a letter to *The New York Times* on May 18, 1958.

THE current debate over the renewal of the Trade Agreements Act seems to be carried on in an atmosphere of unreality. Proponents of renewal stress the advantages to be gained, and opponents stress the harm that may be done, by further reducing tariffs. The fact is that under the proposed legislation no significant reductions are likely to be made. The problem is not whether tariffs are coming down, but whether they are going up.

There are three reasons why tariffs are unlikely to be cut: (1) Most of the fat has already been pared from the tariff schedules; further reductions might begin to cut into the lean meat. (2) Under the "peril point" provision of the law, the Administration is unlikely to offer other governments any concessions which the Tariff Commission might find "perilous" to domestic industries and to which protectionist Congressmen might then object. (3) As a result of the escape clause, other countries are unlikely to offer us concessions of any value, since every concession we offer them will have strings attached.

Escape Clause Broad

Opponents of the trade agreements program have undertaken over the years not to repeal the law but to emasculate it, destroying its substance while preserving its form. In this they have met with marked success. Under the act as it stands there are three bases on which new restrictions on imports may be imposed. (1) Agricultural products can be excluded if their entry would undercut

domestic support prices. (2) Any product can be excluded if it can be argued, however speciously, that its entry would endanger our military security. (3) Products can be excluded if their entry threatens injury to domestic competitors. It is this escape clause that is now in dispute.

Threat to National Interest

Under the law producers can appeal to the Tariff Commission, claiming injury from imports. If the commission finds injury, it may then recommend that the President raise tariffs. For such a finding, it is not necessary that a whole industry suffer injury, but only that particular firms suffer. It is not necessary that a firm suffer injury to its business as a whole, but only to particular items in its line of products. It is not necessary that a firm's sales decline, but only that they fail to increase as rapidly as do those of its foreign competitors. Finally, it is not necessary that anyone shall actually have been injured, but only that he may possibly come to be injured.

This escape clause would seem to be as broad as human ingenuity could make it. And this the pending bill would make even broader, since it would empower the President to raise tariffs, in such cases, not to the levels existing before the trade agreements, but to 150 percent of the mountainous Hawley-Smoot rates.

But the protectionists are not satisfied. Why not? Because the President, under existing law, may refuse to accept the commission's recommendations if he finds it *in the na-*

tional interest to do so. It is this concern for the general interest of the nation, as opposed to the special interests of particular producers, that the protectionists are determined to have stricken from the law. It is for this reason that they seek to deprive the President of his power.

In determining whether to raise a tariff the President may now consider how his action would affect the great body of consumers, how it would affect the millions whose employment depends upon our foreign trade, how it would affect those Americans who have invested abroad, how it would affect the taxpayers, who balance our external accounts by financing foreign aid. More important, he may consider how his action would affect (1) the ability of this country to defend itself by obtaining and holding military allies; (2) the ability of friendly nations to protect themselves against subversion; and (3) the hope of mankind in maintaining peace and preserving free institutions on the face of the earth. These are the considerations that would be ruled out if the present drive to amend the law further were to succeed.

Protected Interests

For the Tariff Commission there is but one consideration: Certain firms might find it difficult to meet import competition. These firms are not in the great industries that embody the productive genius of American enterprise. It is impossible, for instance, to give credence to the complaint of the powerful electrical equipment in-

(Continued on page 150)

by Edgar M. Queeny

Mr. Queeny is chairman of the Monsanto Chemical Company. The entire text of Mr. Queeny's monograph, from which this is drawn, may be obtained from the Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturers Association, 41 East 42 Street, New York 17, New York.

TRADE is usually considered to be commerce between merchants or manufacturers who, after bargaining to obtain the best value, exchange goods for money. Foreign trade implies that this procedure takes place between merchants of one nation and those of another, resulting in exports and imports, accompanied by outflow and inflow of monies as payments.

Such international payments are augmented in both directions by tourist expenditures, private remittances, investments, the take-home pay of immigrant workers, payments for freight, insurance and, in America's case, heavy expenditures in foreign countries for "offshore" purchases of military and other equipment and expenditures by our servicemen and our military establishments located abroad. All these transactions cause money to flow from one nation to another, forming, together with trade, a large part of the international balance of payments—a subject to which I shall return.

Phony Exports

All these transactions, excepting the export-import accounts, however, are ignored in the Administration's propaganda for an extension of the Trade Agreements Act and power to cut tariffs 25 percent. Congress and the public have been told repeatedly that in 1957, exclusive of military transfers, United States exports totaled \$19.5 billion, its imports, \$13 billion. Our imports, as reported, fit the classic interpretation of imports; almost all were bargained for by individuals, then bought and paid for.

But our exports do not stand this test.

The early part of 1957 included a period of world shortage of oil occasioned by the closing of the Suez Canal. Our normal excess of oil imports was reversed; large quantities of American oil and gasoline were exported to swell the 1957 trade total. And during that year \$1.9 billion of our surplus agricultural products such as wheat, corn and rice were shipped abroad by our government without dollar payments.

Inconvertible currencies of the recipient nations such as India, Pakistan and Mexico were accepted and employed in those nations for aid programs, or given to the governments to reduce their national debts. Nevertheless the value of these shipments was included in the "exports." Furthermore, our government supplies many nations such as South Korea and South Vietnam with so-called defense support. Supplies shipped under these programs are included in "exports" also. During fiscal 1957 more than \$1.1 billion was spent for defense support. All supplies shipped to foreign nations under various economic-aid programs are also included in the \$19.5 billion of exports dwelled upon by Administration speakers.

Who Has Gold?

And the Department of Commerce does not take into its official import account the uranium ore imported, reasoning that the information is secret. Yet the Atomic Energy Commission published that uranium imports were over \$191 million in 1957.

Now all factors cited are reflected finally in various international balance-of-payments accounts and wind up in the gold-and dollar holdings of the world's nations.

Despite the drain caused by the Suez crisis, foreign nations' holdings of gold and liquid-dollar balances decreased only \$300 million during 1957—quite a contrast to the \$6.5 billion gap indicated by the export-import account—and it should be noted that foreign gold and dollar holdings increased \$940 million during the first quarter of 1958.

And in 1956 foreign nations increased their gold and dollar balances by \$2 billion, \$1 billion arising through their various transactions with the United States alone. Their 1957 holdings were \$28,551 million, more than double the \$13,825 million they held in prewar 1938. And if one includes the holdings of international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the European Payments Union, which did not exist in prewar years, foreign holdings at the end of 1957 amounted to \$31,209 million. Nor does the figure include private holdings. Neither France, Germany nor Italy, for instance, prohibits individuals from owning gold. They hoard much of it; for France alone, estimates of such gold hoarding exceed \$3 billion.

During the same period American gold holdings decreased slightly from \$21,995 million which we held in prewar 1940, to but \$21,873 million in May 1958, which, however, is a substantial decline from our postwar high of the \$24,600 million held in August 1949.

Even the vast sums invested abroad by American business and other private interests do not account for the increase in foreign gold and dollar holdings. The total of all American private investments abroad is almost matched by foreign investments here

—the respective amounts being \$33 billion and \$31.6 billion.

Heedless of this state of affairs, the Administration's wordsmen lay stress only on the excess of our exports of manufactures over imports of manufactures, citing figures for 1957 of \$10 billion and \$2.75 billion, although the ratio must be normal for an industrial nation. The inference is clear; duties on manufactures will be cut again if Congress grants the necessary authority.

Tariff Reductions Won't Help

The only so-called free nations capable of sending us any significant amount of manufactures are Japan and those of Western Europe. Yet our favorable balance of payments with Western Europe in 1957 was only \$40 million, despite Suez. In 1956 we had a deficit with the area of \$682 million; in 1955, a deficit of \$846 million.

Our favorable balances have been with the rest of the world—especially Canada, Latin America and Japan.

Excepting Japan, further reductions in tariffs would not increase imports of manufactures from the areas

where we have had these favorable balances. Only greater prosperity at home—more people employed, with rising living standards—can increase our consumption of coffee, tea, sugar, wool, iron ore, metals, bauxite and other raw materials which the deficit areas send us.

Now statistics prove that so long as tourism remains a favorite American recreation, so long as the cold war requires American bases abroad, and so long as even a modicum of foreign economic aid continues, we shall not have a favorable balance of payments in the foreseeable future, and foreign nations will continue to increase in wealth and prosperity at least as rapidly as the United States, even though no further reductions are made in our tariffs.

Wilcox

(Continued from page 148)

dustry regarding imports that amount to one-third of 1 percent of its own output, or to that of the immensely profitable chemical industry concerning imports of synthetic organics that amount to one-half of 1 percent of

its own sales. The firms found by the Tariff Commission to face possible injury and denied higher tariffs by the President are in industries producing such goods as tobacco pipes, scissors and shears, stainless steel tableware, hand-blown glassware, screen-printed silk scarves, wood screws and umbrella frames—industries where jobs are few and wages comparatively low.

The real issue that is now before Congress and the country is whether we shall sacrifice the national interest in prosperity, peace and freedom in order to serve the particular interests of a relative handful of "petty" producers, by assuring them a larger share of the market, by sparing them the effort required to increase efficiency and cut costs, and by saving them the inconvenience of shifting from the production of one item to that of another. On this issue the Administration has already agreed to an amendment which would give the Congress power to override the President in escape-clause cases by a two-thirds vote. There should be no further compromise. It would be better to go down to defeat.

FOREIGN POLICY SPOTLIGHT



The Shifting Sands of World Affairs

WASHINGTON—Now that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in the wake of dramatic events in Latin America, the Middle East, France and Algeria, has undertaken a long-term study of the global position of the United States, it is incumbent on all thoughtful citizens to do their share in rethinking this country's role in world affairs. For it is no longer a platitude, but a matter of national concern, to say that in a democracy the representatives of the people cannot function effectively un-

less they know what the voters think—any more than a tree can survive without its roots.

Need for Perspective

In this time of reappraisal, it is more than ever necessary to see the United States, and the rest of the world, with a sense of perspective. No matter how great may be the temptation to succumb to frustration, disillusion and even a new wave of isolationism, we must not forget the genuine achievements of the 13

years since the end of World War II.

In that period the United States, overcoming its tradition of political and military noncommitment and rejecting the postwar temptation to return to "normalcy," courageously and steadfastly faced up to the responsibilities of a leadership it had not sought. Combining realism with imagination, and sympathy with practicality, the United States took many measures which rank as milestones on the road to the future—from the Marshall Plan to Point

Four, from support of the United Nations to encouragement of European unity. Few great powers have been so consistent and so energetic in their endeavors in so short a time. Nor is it a diminution of this nation's achievement to say that it was on occasion inspired by self-interest. For just as one seldom meets genuine saints in private life, so it is seldom, if ever, that groups of human beings organized as nations act solely in a spirit of self-abnegation.

Why then does the outlook seem so dark today? Why do we feel, when we look outside of our borders, that we are surrounded at worst by implacable enemies, at best by jeering critics? Did we, in the past, deceive ourselves—or were we deceived—by unduly optimistic estimates of our position? Or are we today unreasonably cast down?

The Senate study will presumably seek to separate hard facts from facile illusions. But whatever may be its conclusions, there are three points we need to consider.

Problems of Evaluation

First, ample material for analysis of international developments has been readily available since 1945. Scholars, newspaper correspondents, commentators have provided this country with a wealth of information on which to base foreign policy decisions. It is to be assumed that the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency have been at least as energetic and effective as private citizens in obtaining information—unless, as believed by many observers, some sources of knowledge have been dried up in recent years by fear of Congressional investigations, such as occurred in connection with our China policy.

By and large, however, the problem has not been one of obtaining information but of evaluating it. And

here much depends not only on the point of view of a given observer, but on the mood of the majority of the nation at a given time. What looks black to one observer may seem white to another; and the nation may suddenly choose to be blind to the significance of some events.

To give one example, of two people looking at West Germany today one may see an unshakable ally in the struggle against communism, while another sees a country which is generally opposed to rearmament and the rise of nuclear weapons and wishes to find a basis for rapprochement with East Germany. Or Nasser may simultaneously appear as a deceiver of the West and a captive of Moscow, or as a shrewd leader who hopes for favors from both sides and may help the West by remaining neutral. Or NATO may seem to some re-enforced by the Copenhagen conference, while others assert that it is rapidly crumbling. Sooner or later we must choose between these contradictory evaluations, even if we thereby risk the possibility of being proved wrong.

Second, we cannot count on the continuance, even for short periods of time, of a static situation—least of all in a revolutionary period like ours. It would unquestionably be much pleasanter if no one stirred or tried to change things—but that is expecting the impossible. When we complain about the dynamism of Russia or Nasser, or the restlessness of Latin Americans, let us recall that the dynamism of Elizabethan England and Napoleonic France, not to speak of the meteoric rise of the United States in the 19th century, must have seemed disturbing in their day. Nor can we stop Russia's industrialization or trade today—or China's tomorrow—unless we resort to war.

Third, by very reason of the fact that relations between peoples are

constantly subject to change, neither self-satisfaction nor self-castigation constitutes a workable basis for foreign policy. In a period of worldwide storms we have to plot out our course through rapidly shifting sands. One minute Russia seems to be the victor with sputniks and gains in the Middle East—only to lose ground by its conflict with Yugoslavia and its rejection of our proposal for Arctic inspection. But no sooner are we cheered by Russia's setbacks than we are alarmed by Communist gains in Laos, Indonesia's drift away from the West, and the prospect that France may yet be faced with a choice between de Gaulle and the army, and a Popular Front that would include Communists.

In the midst of these rapidly shifting events no one can ask a Secretary of State to foresee all changes in the international weather or to ride out all storms. The United States is not Superman. It cannot solve all problems, many of which existed long before the Republic was founded.

What we can expect, and hope, is that those who conduct foreign policy will be ready to deal with situations as they are, not as we wish they could be. To do this we need a far deeper understanding of the psychology of other peoples than we have had in the past, as Vice President Nixon has pointed out in the case of Latin America, and a greater sensitivity to their traditions, fears and aspirations. We must realize that while our eyes are fixed on what seems good or bad for the United States, other peoples see the world in terms of their own problems.

Administration Concerned

In short, we must deal with realities, no matter how unpleasant they may be. This is not a matter of choice but of necessity. Thomas Carlyle, when told that Margaret Fuller had

exclaimed, "I accept the universe," dryly remarked, "By God, she'd better!"

At no time since the dark days of World War II and the Korean war has the government seemed so beset with difficulties in world affairs. And more than at any time since it took office in 1953, the Eisenhower Administration is eager to enlist the interest and support of the public in the making of current foreign policy decisions. It is divided, however, as to whether the best way to approach the public is by revealing some of its anxieties, or by trying to reassure

citizens that things are under control and that all will turn out to be well in the long run. Those laymen who are continuously in touch with public opinion believe that the Administration would be well advised to be frank with the voters, whose informed participation is essential in a democratic society. Mature persons have more confidence in a physician who forthrightly informs them about the nature and possible cure—or incurableness—of a disease than in one who tries to allay their fears by optimism that may turn out to be unfounded.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

Matthews

(Continued from page 146)

On the political side, as Mr. Nixon saw clearly, there is a long pent-up bitterness over Washington's benevolence toward dictators and our corresponding failure to help the struggling democracies of the region. Of the eight countries Mr. Nixon visited, four — Argentina, Peru, Colombia and Venezuela—have only recently ousted dictatorial regimes. They remember vividly that the United States not only did not help them but showed favor to their dictators.

In the case of Venezuela there was the added fact that its recently overthrown rapacious and brutal dictator, General Marcos Pérez Jiménez, and his sadistic police chief, Pedro Es-

trada, were living in luxury on ill-gotten and enormous gains in the United States at the very time Vice President Nixon was in Caracas.

Finally, Mr. Nixon was paying the price for six years of neglect of Latin America, years in which Secretary of State John Foster Dulles focused most of his attention on Europe, Africa, Asia and the Middle East. Their ignorance of us and our ignorance of them bore this bitter fruit.

On that score alone, the trip of Vice President Nixon, painful though it was for him and for the United States, will prove very useful. We see now that much has been wrong with our policies, that we have to do something about them and that we must never again neglect Latin America.

It was worth paying a high price to learn these important lessons.

Mr. Matthews has been with *The New York Times* since 1922, and since 1949 has served as a member of its editorial staff, covering Latin American and Spanish affairs. He is the author of *The Yoke and the Arrows: A Report on Spain* (New York, Braziller, 1957) and "The U.S. and Latin America," *Headline Series* No. 100 (New York, Foreign Policy Association, July 1953.)

FPA Bookshelf

Here are some books of current interest:

ABOUT FRANCE. . . . *The Big Change in Europe*, by Blair Bolles. (New York, Norton, 1958, \$5.95). The associate editor of the *Toledo Blade* and its former European correspondent, who was director of the FPA Washington Bureau 1944-51, paints an exceptionally interesting picture of postwar trends in Europe, with a good deal of fresh material on France. This is also a good time to look at *The Call to Honour, 1940-42*, the first volume of the war memoirs of General Charles de Gaulle (New York, Viking, 1955, \$5.00).

ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST. . . . *Lebanon in History*, by Philip K. Hitti (New York, St. Martin's Press, 1957, \$9.00). This is a comprehensive work by a distinguished scholar, professor emeritus of Semitic literature at Princeton University, covering the Lebanon from the earliest times to the present. Freda Utley, known for her anticommunist writings on the Far East, urges the United States to respond to the nationalist aspirations of the Arabs in *Will the Middle East Go West?* (Chicago, Regnery, 1957, \$3.00). Otherwise, she contends, the Middle East may prove another China.

ABOUT U.S. FOREIGN POLICY PROBLEMS. . . . Two prominent Democrats try to discover new approaches to persisting problems: Dean Acheson in *Power and Diplomacy* (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1958, \$3.00) and Thomas K. Finletter, in *Foreign Policy: The Next Phase* (New York, Harper, for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1958, \$3.50).

FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

345 East 46th Street, New York 17, N. Y.

In this issue:

| | |
|--|-----|
| The Lessons of Latin America— | |
| H. L. Matthews | 145 |
| The Middle East Storm—N. Stanford | 147 |
| Should Reciprocal Trade Program Be Continued?— | |
| C. Wilcox | 148 |
| E. M. Queeny | 149 |
| The Sands of World Affairs— | |
| | 150 |
| | 152 |

BETHANY COLLEGE LIBR.

BETHANY

W. VA.

LS-11